Free trade denotes a state of international commercial relations premised on governments' restraint from using policy instruments meant to favor indigenous industries against foreign competitors. According to the conventional trade theory advocated by classical and neo-classical thinkers, free trade makes little economic sense failing nations' tendency to specialize based on comparative advantage, a concept with high persuasive influence despite the elapsing of time. Even though the comparative advantage rule has seldom been questioned per se, the free trade concept has been fiercely disputed and not infrequently, bashed. Nations' involvement in international trade often follows patterns that do not fit theoretical models but attempt to respond to circumstantial interests, most often the need to protect poorly competitive industries. In common parlance, free trade has had both proponents and enemies.
Conventional theory fundamentals: hardly dampened by the elapsing of time

Comparative advantage: a long-life concept
That the classical theory of international trade (hereafter called the conventional theory), expounded more than two hundred years ago, has passed the test of time, is evidenced by the endurance of its underlying notions, especially comparative advantage, widely considered as one of the most influential concepts produced by economic thought ever. One could hardly imagine a discussion on a trade issue, however trivial, that should not involve, directly or indirectly, the comparative advantage principle. Yet for all its simplicity and strong intuitive power, a lot of people still fail to grasp its gist. Suppose, as an example, that one endeavors to explain someone else that every nation on earth, however poor, will enjoy comparative advantage in trading with other nations (one important premise of the conventional theory). The comparative advantage concept is more than a theoretical principle or a normative trade policy rule. The fact that nations tend to specialize on a comparative advantage basis is more or less a natural phenomenon, as Ricardo himself noted: "Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its capital and labor to such employments that are most beneficial to each." 1 The idea was later emphasized by neoclassical thinkers e.g. Nobel Prize winner Wassily Leontief (1969) : "Not unlike businesses and individuals, each area specializes in those lines of economic activity to which it happens to be best suited and then trades some of its own outputs for commodities and services in the production of which other countries have a comparative advantage."
Obviously, Ricardo's postulated thesis was susceptible to extended improvement, which neoclassical thinkers did at the turn of the 20 th century. Still, one fundamental aspect has remained yet to be laid bare, that is the actual sources of comparative advantage, namely the reasons for which countries exhibited differences in labor productivity in the first place. The issue was dealt with by two Swedish economists, Bertil Ohlin and Eli Heckscher, who found that countries generally tended to export those products that used their relatively abundant factors intensively. The new paradigm, aka factor proportion theorem, rests on two basic concepts: factor abundance, and factor intensity, respectively. While the former measures countries' relative endowment with resources, the latter expresses the relative proportion in which factors are used in the production of goods.
Referring to the question asked by the unknowledgeable John Doe (hypothesized earlier), it can be answered by means of the factor proportion principle: economies that are relatively abundant in unskilled or semi-skilled labor (such as is the case of most Saharan countries) tend to specialize in export goods and services that use these factors intensively. This is simply because labor abundance makes labor relatively cheaper (i.e. wage rates are relatively lower) in comparison with other economies. It follows that even the most star-crossed Sub-Saharan economy, whose sole resources are "sun and sand", will be better off by engaging itself in international trade than staying in autarchy even though rich countries can reap a larger gain from exchanges. Generalizing, "any country, however poorly endowed or managed, will enjoy comparative advantage in some activity relative to other countries and can therefore beneficially participate in the world trade." (UNIDO, 1995)
Sources of comparative advantage: still a controversial topic
Factor proportion-based specialization underpinned the first division of labor between Europe and North America in the first half of the 20 th century, as per Samuelson (1948) 's empirical observation: because labor was relatively abundant in Europe, labor-intensive industries such as textiles and clothing gained preponderance, whereas in the US, labor intensive industries have been systematically protected from import competition, causing the respective goods to sell at higher prices on the domestic market.
The factor endowment theorem's explanatory power is nevertheless limited due to its resting on certain unrealistic assumptions such as the one according to which nations use identical technologies to produce goods, implying that comparative advantage will result from differences among countries, not in labor productivity, as postulated by Ricardo, but exclusively in the way resources are distributed on the Earth's surface. Yet, admitting this were true, the relation between physical and economic abundance, respectively scarcity of factors, becomes murky. According to factor proportion theorem proponents, "wages in poorer countries are much lower not necessarily because of lower productivity relative to developed countries but because of the huge supply of labor they are endowed with, which obviously exceeds demand." 2 However, in many actual instances, this is not true. For example, Kravis (1956) noted that although labor was relatively scarce in the US, wages in labor-intensive industries (mostly import-competing ones) were lower as compared to export industries that used other factors (e.g. land, knowledge etc.) intensively.
Not only do nations not use identical technologies to produce a given good, but technological change may occur even inside countries. This fact simply rules out the presumed impossibility of factor intensity reversals, as considered by Heckscher and Ohlin. Even admitting the production function were identical in all countries, factor intensity reversals are still possible because the elasticity of factor substitution, though constant inside industries, varies across sectors. "It is only to be expected, Minhas argues, that as wage rates rise relative to capital costs, the industry with the higher elasticity of substitution between capital and labor becomes relatively more capital intensive than the industry with the lower elasticity of substitution, even though the capital intensity of both is going up."
In conclusion, according to Yeaple and Golub (2007) , "...productivity differences are inconsistent with the standard neoclassical HeckscherOhlin model of international trade, which assumes identical technologies across countries. These international differences in sectoral total factor productivity suggest that comparative advantage has a Ricardian character, reflecting technological differences between countries."
Keeping up with the times: comparative advantage dynamics
The existence of certain limits does not mean the factor endowment theorem is no longer relevant and should be discarded; such an option has been vehemently rejected even by its fiercest critics. 3 On the contrary, the solution lies in adapting the theorem to contemporary international trade reality. To this effect, significant adjustments and redefinitions were undertaken by Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1980) 4 , Findley (1984) 5 and Markusen et al. (1995) 6 . On the other hand, since the factor proportion theorem offers but a static image of international specialization, mostly based on countries' resources endowment, scholars endeavored to get an insight as to how this state is likely to change in time and what factors might determine such changes. In line with this trend, studies by scholars (e.g. Minhas, 1962 , Heller, 1976 7 , Hufbauer, 1970 8 , Balassa 1977 etc.) attempted to ascertain to what degree technology development and human capital accumulation may alter the structure of comparative advantage and international exchanges of processed goods. Minhas (1962) questioned the basic relation between physical and economic abundance of factors, stating that it was not necessarily a unidirectional one, as emphasized by Heckscher and Ohlin. This is mainly because of export demand, which is usually biased toward the physically abundant factor, thereby making it more expensive, not cheaper. The proportion in which factors combine in the production of a good as well as factor prices may change depending on the economic context in which production occurs. It is for this reason that wage rate ratios not always reflect productivity ratios among countries. Because wages are chiefly determined in national labor markets, they "should not reflect productivity at the level of the individual company or industry but at the level of a given national economy". (Krugman, 1996) 10 Comparative advantage dynamics is reflected in the countries' international specialization pattern, which has been undergoing continuous change due to economic, technological and political factors. Economically, the industrial revolutions had speeded up the development of western nations relative to the rest of the world. Technologically, the former made great headway in terms of labor productivity thanks to large scale automation and better management. Politically, governments' trade strategies, including steps toward regional integration exerted direct or indirect influence on goods and factor prices on world markets. These changes sensibly altered the international division of labor picted by Samuelson in the 1940s. Most significantly, labor-intensive industries gradually shifted from the industrialized North tot he developing South.
Europe's comparative advantage in clothing for example, invoked by Samuelson, shifted to more backward regions of the world, including Eastern Europe. Regarding North America's alleged comparative advantage in agricultural products due to its land abundance, the reverse is true: North America exhibits a disadvantage in this type of products despite the region's high productivity in farming.
In summary, because western countries have experienced speedier technological upgrading relative to developing countries, comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries shifted to the latter. Yet comparative advantage associated with cheap labor is inherently volatile 11 the more so as labor costs as a percentage of the total costs of a firm have been declining constantly. By contrast, specialization could be successful and lead to sustained growth only if based on the development of technological knowledge and skills. Because investment in plant and equipment is highly correlated with growth and so are education and human capital upgrading, changing international specialization requires the implementation of a development strategy based on the novel concept of dynamic comparative advantage. (Cypher, Dietz, 1999) The bottom line is that "comparative advantage changes with accumulation…" (Lall, 2001) The relevance of conventional theory under globalization Under globalization, the prominent tendency is that production processes should be broken down into "separate parts that can be located in countries in which factor prices are well matched to the factor intensity of the particular fragments". (Jones, Marjit, 2001 ) The increasing fragmentation of production has given rise to a different kind of international division of labor, suggestively depicted by Krugman et al. (1995) : "a good is produced in a number of stages in a number of locations, adding a little bit of value at each stage". In this new context, although the labor-intensive sector is still highly mobile due to its relatively high propensity for outsourcing, it is no longer entire industries that are on the move but mere segments of the commodity chain that use man's work with relative intensity. During the last decades, the production of labor-intensive goods has expanded over a vast area of the developing world, including countries which, though systematically by-passed by foreign investors because of their poorly competitive economies, control large and often untapped pools of unskilled labor.
What relevance does the comparative advantage concept have under the new conditions? One thing is certain: low wages are ever less a source of comparative advantage, which results not from the absolute cost of producing a good but from its opportunity cost. A terminological differentiation is therefore necessary: the comparative advantage concept needs to be distinguished from the absolute advantage in manufacturing operations (mostly requiring unskilled labor), resulting from wage rate differentials among countries. On the contrary, comparative advantage must be associated with firms' capacity to acquire the knowledge and technical and managerial abilities that should enable them to carry out all the skilled-labor intensive activities involved by the production and marketing of a good, not just the unskilled-labor intensive ones required in final assembly. It is thus easier to understand why labor-intensive industries are highly mobile -both geographically and socially -and why scholars consider the comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries, volatile. Countries that have comparative advantage in the production of labor-intensive goods or labor-intensive operations will be tempted to forego the manufacturing of the respective goods or the performing of the respective operations in favor of other poorer countries, where wages are even lower and unskilled labor is abundant. A country, say, Taiwan can have comparative advantage in the production of a good, say, computer hardware, without producing any physical unit of it; the entire production (assembly) will be subcontracted to companies located in a less-advanced neighboring country, say Vietnam.
Globalization is a process with far-reaching implications. The unfettered movement of capital across borders allows multinational companies to fragment production and relocate activities on the earth's surface. In this context, the conventional theory is being faced with challenges deriving from novel phenomena such as intra-firm trade, international expansion of firms through vertical integration or horizontal development, international trade in intermediary goods etc. These aspects generated changes in both markets' organization and structure of international trade, the most remarkable of which is surely the sustained expansion of intra-industry trade. Intra-industry trade -which makes up the bulk of the trade unfolding among developed countries, involving flows of similar types of goods -is hard to explain by means of the conventional theory in its neoclassical form, which rests on two unrealistic premises, namely perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Once these two basic assumptions are discarded, the rationale of intra-industry trade becomes obvious: firms wish to increase their sales on foreign markets to reap economies of scale. Evidently, this last aim is incompatible with perfect competition. 12 .
Economists (Chang and Katayama, 1995) explained this incompatibility through the correlation between firms' marginal and medium costs: economies of scale render marginal cost lower than medium cost. If firms faced perfect competition, they would be compelled to fix the sales price at the level of marginal cost, thereby incurring losses. Yet according to Dollar (1993) , the explanation, though accurate, is not complete because it fails to clarify the role of comparative advantage. "Economies of scale in the production process, the cited author argues, may be part of the explanation for this (intra-industry-type) specialization; but they are not likely to encompass the whole story. Technological differences at the industry level -rooted in economies of scale and scope in R&D and training -may be able to explain much of the observed pattern of trade in goods. Such differences can provide a basis for trade even if overall factor supplies are similar." 12 In a nutshell, technological development may be a source of long-term comparative advantage on condition that it occurs on a continuum basis and is backed by innovation-friendly institutions. "Institutions that generate new technology on an ongoing basis and train complementary technical labor are likely to be the main source of longterm comparative advantage for high-technology industries" -concludes the cited author. The idea is supported by Tyson (1995) : "…a nation's comparative advantage in such industries is less a function of its natural factor endowments and more a function of strategic interactions between its firms and government and the firms and governments in other nations. In such industries, comparative advantage is created, not endowed by nature."
Former and contemporary enemies of free trade
The root of resentment: pre-industrial mercantilism
Owing to its robustness and good sense, the conventional theory has been enjoying tremendous popularity during the last two centuries, gathering legions of proponents. Still, opponents have not been few either. In time, Ricardian principles have been questioned, denied, refuted and not infrequently outright or even bluntly attacked. The earliest onslaught dates to the crumbling of the Middle Ages order, when European nationstates would strive for political unity and international prominence. Since political assertion needed economic support, most of them embraced mercantilism as the surest way to feed monarchs' treasuries with gold and enhance people's well-being. This, in the mind of the then leaders, could best be accomplished through a unidirectional way of trading with other nations, namely by fostering exports and raising barriers to imports, which is tantamount to saying that export earnings were to be maximized whereas import expenditures, were to be kept to a minimum. It is for these reasons that historians defined mercantilism as a brutal form of hampering free trade and implicitly economic liberty. "In this sense, it was the opposite of the laissez-faire system, which Smith would later advocate. In one popular form it consisted of bullionism -the idea that a country's wealth and power depended on amassing gold. In another, it concentrated on improving the balance of trade by assisting exports, penalizing imports, and encouraging home manufactures." (Davis, 1997) The bad effects of mercantilism upon national economies had already become apparent after the English Civil War but were most visible in 17 th century France, where the government had restricted competition by employing monopoly restrictions and barring imports. Consequently, as Nobel laureate Douglas North (1981) noted, "the French economy remained regional in nature and as a result the gains from a growing market were sacrificed. The benefits of competition were lost to numerous local monopolies that not only exploited their legal position but also discouraged innovation."
Although mercantilism asserted itself -both as a doctrine and economic policy -during the pre-industrial era, to look upon it merely as a reminiscence of the past would certainly be illusive. Contemporary nations have embraced mercantilist practices with no less aplomb. Mercantilism serves, rather often, two chief objectives: either to accelerate the development of backward economies as was the case of China during the past three decades, or to turn to account, through extended exports and foreign investment, technological prowess in hi-tech industries, as Germany has done after the Second World War. (In 2016, the two countries' trade surplus amounted to $200 and $300 billion respectively. 13 ) Still, whether the latter's trade policy is indeed mercantilist in nature is open to question. As The Economist recently emphasized, "at bottom, a trade surplus is an excess of national saving over domestic investment. In Germany's case, this is not the result of a mercantilist government policy, as some foreigners complain…Underlying Germany's surplus is a decades-old accord between business and unions in favor of wage restraint to keep export industries competitive. Such moderation served Germany's export-led economy well through its postwar recovery and beyond." 14 Beyond the various arguments and considerations, one thing is certain: present day mercantilism has enabled nations employing it to amass huge amounts of hard currency reserves -matched by balance of payments deficits in the case of partner-countries, mostly the United States-thereby fueling noticeable serious global commercial and financial imbalances. We shall discuss this subject in more detail later.
Industrialization-driven nationalism: more fuel to the fire
It was not by chance that the conventional theory emerged in early 19 th century Britain, namely at a time when the British society was torn apart by severe political and economic contradictions. The British economy was at a turning point: a bunch of fledgling industries engendered by the industrial revolution had to co-exist with an advanced though crippled and slowly-developing agricultural sector. Ostensibly the latter needed border protection to stave off cheaper grains and meat products from abroad, especially from North America.
On a broader plan, the advent of industrialization in Western Europe and North America triggered the restructuring of the world market, industrial products gaining preponderance relative to the farm ones. Yet this shift sparked a fierce race among industrialized nations themselves for an as big slice as possible of the industrial market pie. As a rule of thumb, first come, first serve: Britain, which had embarked upon industrialization earlier was able to skim off the market. Failing mighty rivals, British industries quickly came to control the world exports of textiles, coal, pig iron, steel, steam engines and other manufactured goods. "It (Britain) alone was responsible for one fifth of the world's commerce, but for two fifths of the trade in manufactured goods" -British historian Paul Kennedy (1987) noted. Unlike the agricultural sector, which faced stiff competition from abroad, therefore demanding border protection, British industries were prospering under free trade, both at home and on alien markets. Consequently, along the first half of the 19 th century, Britain pursued a dual trade policy: imposing high tariffs on imports of agricultural products, chiefly grains (the so-called Corn Laws) on the one hand; unfettered trade in manufactured goods on the other hand. Ironically, despite Britain being the world's number one agricultural power, the British people were suffering due to the high price of grains and other foodstuffs.
Duality of Britain's trade policy was put an end to by mid-19 th century, following a long-standing campaign against the Corn Laws, promoted by Richard Cobden, the founder of the Anti-Corn Laws League. The eventual rescindment of the Corn Laws marked Britain's definitive shift to free trade. "Until 1860, free trade -in the specific sense of absence of protectionist tariffs -had become a sort of orthodoxy for British politicians, almost as powerful as protestant inheritance." 16 Yet Britain's attitude clashed with the other western nations', where industrial revolution had been delayed by half-century. In countries like Germany and the United States, the free trade doctrine was matched against a public effervescence in support of protectionism. Actually, in America, urges for the adoption of protectionist measures had been voiced shortly after the winning of independence, as emphasized by Professor Robert Reich (1991) by quoting from Alexander Hamilton (the first Secretary of the Treasury under George Washington)'s Report on the Subject of Manufactures, issued in 1791: "small manufacturers in the United States could never catch up with the larger and more advanced manufacturers of Europe unless they were protected and subsidized, at least temporarily." Yet it required one hundred years to go by for Hamilton's appeal to materialize: the US became highly protectionist in the last decade of the 19 th century. In the meantime, especially after 1850, Germany became the champion of protectionism in Europe, being pushed by the desire to come on a par with already industrialized Britain.
The tendency of governments to protect fledgling industries against foreign competition obviously had deeper causes, which became obvious once German economist Friedrich List published his well-known political treatise "Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie" in 1841, where he expounded on the national economy issue. Basically, List's thesis claimed that Germany and other nations that had experienced the Industrial Revolution with certain delay could only grow strong and defy potential menaces from other nations by fostering their manufacturing sectors. According to List, "war or the possibility of war makes the establishment of a manufacturing power an indispensable requirement for a nation of the first rank." 15 . What List suggested was highly similar to Alexander Hamilton's demand, cited earlier: for countries like Germany free trade was a luxury they couldn't afford under the circumstances. In fact, as Ludwig von Mises (1957) remarked, many modern historians think that "the advocates of integral free trade, the Manchester or laissez-faire Liberals are…unrealistic and do not see that free trade hurts the vital interests of any nation resorting to it."
The battle for free trade intensified after the abrogation of the Corn Laws, only to reach its climax after 1860, the year in which Britain and France concluded the first international commercial agreement to include the most favored nation treatment clause, ever. 17 The event was a resounding success as it marked the kickoff of the struggle for the elimination of discrimination from international trade relations. Yet the success was short lived because the advocates of protectionism concomitantly staged unprecedented rallies against free trade. In the US, the dispute between the pro-free trade movement and economic nationalists (in the sense of List's theory) sparked fierce infighting inside political parties. According to American historian Marc-William Palen (2016) , "the Republican party's Cobdenite independence, believing that free trade and non-interventionism would bring prosperity and peace to the world, found themselves outnumbered by Republicans who instead believed that nations were locked in a perpetual state of war. For the latter, protectionism was viewed both as a defensive and an offensive weapon for sheltering American infant industries from unfettered global market competition, especially from Free Trade England."
In terms of political philosophy, the 19 th century battle for free trade was in fact a confrontation between nationalists and advocates of cosmopolitanism. The former championed a two-prong strategy: protection of the home market combined with a more aggressive trade policy against other nations, whose markets were considered insufficiently open to US products. Eventually, nationalists' fiery intransigence tipped the scales in their favor so that the US Congress enacted a highly protectionist law, the so-called McKinley Tariff, in 1890.
Further convulsions: early 20 th century mercantilism
Following a tumultuous age, during which most nations had grown protectionist, the turn of the 20 th century did not augur well for the free trade movement. The forthcoming war Friedrich List had foretold in his theory rendered nations increasingly unwilling to accept tariffs reduction or to cooperate in any fashion for the liberalization of international exchanges. Although the end of the First World War brought about some détente, the outbreak of the Great Depression in the late 1920s swung the public mood back against free trade, in favor of protectionism. In the US, a bill was passed (the Smoot-Hawley Tariff) that raised tariffs at an even higher level than the one provided by McKinley Tariff. Economists denounced such measures as being disastrous: "…it was at a precarious time of depression that the Hoover administration chose to hobble international trade, injure the American consumer, and cripple the American farmers' export markets by raising tariffs higher than their already high levels." (Rothbard, 2000) The protectionist wave that swept across crisis-stricken economies caused the shrinkage of international trade relative to the pre-war period. Only this time high tariffs were less a means to foster industrial development but rather a solution for survival. Faced with the specter of economic decline and sky-high unemployment, nations tended to insulate themselves from external influences. One would believe the closing of the economy would shelter the latter against the bad effects of the crisis. It is for this reason that the raising of barriers to trade was accompanied by other aggressive unilateral measures such as currency devaluations meant to keep exports competitive. Undervaluing the own currency relative to other countries was indeed a useful short run instrument for fighting balance of payments deficits because it made exports cheaper and imports more expensive. Yet this type of neo-mercantilism (aka beggar-thyneighbor-type policy) turned out to be disruptive for the world economy in that it led to a devaluation spiral, thereby generating monetary chaos.
First post-World War II decades: decisive steps toward trade liberalization
Two paramount economic events marked the beginning of the postWorld War II era, namely the Bretton Woods Conference held in 1944, and the conclusion of the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948, respectively. The former's chief objective was to restore order in international monetary relations, which had been seriously disturbed by the devaluations frenzy of the 1930s. This implied pegging the value of national currencies to gold by means of the US dollar. "All national monies, even those of the communist countries, were linked to the dollar and, hence, at least in theory, to gold." (Kaletski, 2011) 18 As for the GATT, it embodied nations' efforts to curtail the 1930's protectionism which had wreaked a great deal of havoc on the world's commercial exchanges. Although the objective of establishing the International Trade Organization (ITO) was not reached because most developing nations voted against it, the emergence of GATT was still a success because the most important principles, rules and norms that should govern international trade were enshrined therein.
Of course, the birth of the GATT was by no means a purely economic phenomenon but had a strong political drive, mostly stemming from the United States' "postwar commitment to a liberal trading order." (Bhagwati, 1988) Although trade liberalization would undoubtedly work in US' favor -because the American unscathed industries were keen to get access to foreign markets -one should not judge the American support to the establishment of GATT as a selfish undertaking, in the sense that the other nations' interest was viewed by the Americans as being subservient to their own. On the contrary, according to scholars (Bhagwati, 1988) , the US's approach was rather altruistic: "In the political interest of building a stronger Europe, for example, the United States allowed asymmetrical access to markets during the long period when Europe was shifting to convertibility in current-account transactions. And the United States acquiesced in the enactment of Part IV and the granting of other special and differential treatment to developing countries, which gave them a handicap…"
Industrialization of the developing world: nationalism rekindled
Besides the two important events mentioned earlier, World War II also brought about a paramount change in the world order entrenched by the 19 th century Industrial Revolution, that is the beginning of the industrialization of the developing world. With few exceptions, developing countries had been excluded from the first industrialization wave that had swept through Europe and North America in the second half of the 19 th century and the first half of the 20 th century. Beginning with the 1950s, a host of developing countries set out to industrialize themselves following the model pioneered by western nations. Therefore, during the last 70 years, industrial manufacturing has become a basic economic sector in many developing countries. (Burnete, Choomta, 2015) The industrialization of large areas of the globe determined noticeable structural shifts in the world manufacturing and trade but it equally triggered a commensurate resurgence of protectionism. For better or for worse, Friedrich List and his theory about the necessity of providing protection to infant industries were once again in vogue. Leaving aside the former communist countries, the infant industry argument underlay the trade policy of many countries of the non-communist world, most intensely in Latin America. The process was suggestively described by Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz (2005) : "Since most of manufactured goods consumed in these countries were imported, they came to the conclusion that the path to success lay in encouraging domestic firms to produce the consumer goods that had previously been acquired from abroad. Accordingly, many developing countries embarked on 'import substitution policies'. It was argued that they should import only 'essential' capital goods." Obviously, this abrupt change of course in many countries' trade policy translated into the latter attempting to specialize in industries in which they were uncompetitive. According to reputed economists (Stiglitz, 2005) , this was equivalent to an "anathema to the simple logic of comparative advantage that David Ricardo had elucidated more than a century before."
As Krugman (1995) pointed out, "international trade has become inextricably intertwined with industrial organization." However, the experience of the post-war period has revealed that "international trade backs development when one country's economic growth is stimulated by its exports" (Stiglitz, 2002) . On the other hand, the export-promotion strategy requires certain skills and know-how which poor countries cannot easily acquire. Today, many developing countries "are promoting an exportbiased strategy, hoping to establish a dynamic base that should boost investments and support general economic growth. Unfortunately, industrial enterprises in these countries often lack the required knowledge and abilities that should allow them to compete on the global markets." (UNIDO, 1995)
A novel redoubtable enemy: non-tariff barriers
The most outstanding merit of the GATT lies in that it ushered in multilateralism as a universally-accepted means to underlie commercial negotiations among all nations of the world. The rounds of negotiations, which had been unfolding under the aegis of GATT in the four decades after the Second World War, resulted in substantial reduction of tariffs, preponderantly in the trade in industrial goods. Yet, ironically, the shrinkage of tariff protection did not put an end to protectionism because countries have shifted away from tariffs to somewhat more complex forms of nontariff protection. Furthermore, the employing of non-tariff instruments had a disproportionate impact upon nations, developing countries being more afflicted due to the labor-intensiveness of their exports. "While capital intensive goods experienced greater dynamism and enjoyed the benefit of deeper tariff reductions, labor-intensive goods remained relatively protected, with below average tariff reductions as well as a greater incidence of nontariff regulations." (Tussie, Woods, 2000) Protectionism and the second-best theory Two fundamental assumptions underlie the conventional theory, namely perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Obviously one hundred and fifty years after the theory was formulated, these assumptions are purely theoretical i.e. they hardly match reality. Consequently, the question whether free trade is still the optimal policy, regardless of circumstances, is up for discussion. Debates became very animated during the 1980s. Paul Krugman (1995)'s rhetorical question: "Is free trade passé?" -signaled a fundamental change of outlook and paved the way for the adoption of a new theory of international trade. The representatives of the new wave focused on two basic concepts which, according to their view, could better explain contemporary international trade than comparative advantage, namely "second best optimal," and "managed trade", respectively.
From the 1980s onward, perfect competition and constant returns to scale would remain pure theoretical assumptions and therefore inappropriate to underlie international trade theory. Furthermore, the new theory challenged, for the first time, the traditional view that all nations gained from trade, should the latter be free. Although certain models still support this idea, the fact that free trade is no longer the best policy is now apparent. "If increasing returns and imperfect competition are necessary parts of the explanation of international trade, however, we are living in a second-best world where government intervention can in principle improve on market outcomes." -Krugman concludes. To summarize, this is the essence of the "theory of the second best", according to which, "in the presence of multiple distortions (such as domestic taxes or monopoly), welfare is not necessarily improved by removing a single distortion (such as an import tariff). An equivalent statement is that in the presence of distortions, adding an additional distortion may improve welfare." (Markusen et al., 1995) The necessity of managed trade is derived, firstly, from the existence of market failures or distortions, and secondly, from the eternal desire of sovereign states to regulate this matter of utmost importance for their welfare. "In reality, the world of international trade is not a world of free trade. Governments control or manage trade in various ways. Even the regulations of the GATT, an organization championed by most free traders, are a concoction of negotiations among governments, not private traders." (Tyson, 1995) . Briefly, in several cases, particularly in the presence of distortions or asymmetries, optimality of free trade is under question. (Bhagwati, 1971) This does not mean that alternative policies that should be effective in ruling out these distortions and asymmetries are always at hand. Such policies are difficult to formulate and even more difficult to enforce. The important thing here is the trade-off: the opportunity of managed trade must not necessarily be understood as an argument against free trade. Even if we are faced with clear-cut cases of market failure in international trade, it will not follow that the optimal policy restricts free trade. The United States fell in this trap in the eighties, when the "infamous Section 301 legislation" (Bhagwati, 2002) was passed, providing the White House with "the authority to condemn other nations…as unfair traders and then to follow up with tariff retaliation…" (Bhagwati, 2002) 
Concluding remarks
Today, two hundred years after the emergence of the conventional theory, the discussion about free trade is unfolding on a higher plan, in both theory and policy. The belief that free trade could sometimes be harmful is getting ever more entrenched. Economic theory has offered insights into the question why free trade is not always and everywhere the optimal policy.
The comparative advantage concept underlies the so-called conventional theory that has been largely used by scholars in explaining the mechanisms of international trade. In time, the intuitive power of the comparative advantage principle has remained unfalter in gin spite of the commercial relations among nations being subject to numerous changes due to economic, technological and political factors. Unquestionably, since the beginning of the industrialization in the West two centuries ago to this day, international trade has always provided a strong underpinning for nations' industrial development. On the other hand, the link between industry and trade also generated one highly disputable issue, namely whether industrial development would be fostered or hampered by unfettered trade. Economic literature abounds in pros and cons on this theme. Discussions are not less animated today, when conventional theory is faced with additional challenges deriving from novel phenomena such as intra-firm trade, international expansion of firms through vertical integration or horizontal development, international trade in intermediary goods, labor and environmental issues etc. Due to the complexity of today's international background, the new theories promote a more nuanced way of tackling freedom of trade. Perfect competition and constant returns to scale serve as pure theoretical assumptions and therefore are inappropriate to underlie international trade theory.
Consequently, free trade is no longer viewed as the best of all possible policy options. Furthermore, optimality of free trade policy is dependent on the structure of the economy, more specifically, on the existence and size of domestic distortions. If this is the case, additional trade barriers (taxcum-subsidies) could be used to offset these distortions and thereby increase welfare.
advantage are subject to two parameters, namely the propensity toward savings, and the growth rate of the labor farce, respectively. 6 Markusen et al. replace the traditional "factor proportion" concept with a different one, namely the "factor content" of a nation's exports. According to the authors, the new term suggests a more direct, more palpable connection between a nation's factor endowment and its international specialization. 7 Heller undertook a test on Japan's economy. The results, published in 1976, demonstrated clearly enough that the change of factor proportion that had occurred in the respective economy during the first decades after WWII, had caused an essential change in the structure of its comparative advantage, namely a shift of the gravity center of Japan's exports from labor-intensive toward capitaintensive goods. 8 Hufbauer's test was meant to ascertain to what extent commercial exchanges flows among nations reflected the structure of their respective economies, in other words, how tight is the correlation between the characteristics of international exchanges and those of participating countries. 9 Balassa's study is focused on the US's economy, revealing an interesting aspect: American industries had set out to produce new types of goods, involving new technologies, while older industries were being transferred to other countries. 10 "It is a fact, Krugman contends, that some Bangladeshi apparel factories manage to achieve labor productivity close to half those of comparable installations in the United States, although overall Bangladeshi manufacturing productivity is probably only about 5 percent of the US level. Non-economists find it extremely disturbing and puzzling that wages in those productive factories are only 10 percent of US standards." 11 Volatility of comparative advantage is a term coined by Bhagwati (2002) , who used it to explain the loss of comparative advantage by western economies beginning with the 1980s, in a few industries, in favor of their rivals from emerging economies, mainly from South-East Asia. 12 The author points to major export categories that are completely dominated by one developed country. For example, he notes, in 1985 Japan accounted for half of world exports of color TV receivers; the United States accounted for half of electromedical equipment exports; and Germany accounted for half of rotaryprinting-press exports. 13 "Why Germany's current account surplus is bad for the world economy", The Economist. 
